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Abstract: Logos has been the fundamental of human behavior. However, it often appears as diverse expressions 
such as reason, rationality or reasonableness at different times. It seems obvious that each of them has its own 
limitation relative to logos itself. Therefore, it has still been a problematic issue how to approach logos. For this 
reason, we will try to approach logos on the basis of the relationship among and between the three expressions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There always seems to be logos everywhere. It cannot be seen or touched, but exactly the real 
influencing factor that making things happen. From each decision made unconsciously tens of 
thousands of times every day to the evolutionary history of human, everything seems to be 
regulated implicitly by logos. Of course, when we talk about the ancient Greek term logos, 
considering all diverse forms of human life world, including different regions divided by 
geography feature, different social communities ruled by various culture or religion faith, even 
disparate lifestyles depending on occupations or social status in the same society, different forms 
of logos should be taken into account, which represent different aspects of principle, steer the 
routes of everything, and jointly construct the whole of image of an operating world. 
It is true that there exists established law of period potentially in human history. In the 
meanwhile, this mysterious law implies the secret of logos, which foreshadows the development 
of human and draws the background color of human fate. That is to say, logos is closely tied up 
with development of human being. Thus, without an authentic and true understanding of logos, it 
would be nothing but a means, an instrument of self-destruction. And such a destructive, chaotic 
world is surely anti-humanity.    
In the next section, based on the significance and inevitability of the topic, we will at first 
outline the origin of logos and its development by appealing to ancient philosophers and their 
foresighted theoretical achievements. We tentatively classify them into three dimensions: reason, 
rationality, and reasonableness. Through overall and deep documents consulting, we primarily 
introduce the intricate history of logos family, including dictatorship of reason in earlier stage 
and crisis of rationality in afterward stage, as well as its evolutionary form which is 
reasonableness. 
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Faced with this complicated world, if we want to draw up the dividing line between 
theory and practice, philosophy and science, lives and life, the first step is to find the clear 
demarcation among and between reason, rationality, and reasonableness. And this is also the 
topic we will discuss in the third section. Over the past few decades, the notions of reason, 
rationality, and reasonableness have been mentioned in academic researches worked by not only 
logicians but also scholars from interdisciplinary fields, such as psychologists, economists, 
jurists, politicians, among others. However, there are plenty of circumstances in disorder. For 
instance, the mis-transformation of reason to rationality is common for a long period. The 
universal reason and instrumental rationality cannot make up certain deficiencies which reveal 
necessity of the concept of reasonableness. Among these conflicts, we attempt to figure out what 
happens when reason, rationality, and reasonableness are regarded as logos respectively, and 
what defects they have. This is closely related to the principles which embrace different aspects 
of life, including our ultimate concern towards ontological dimension, instrumental theories in 
natural science and human affairs in practical life.  
In the fourth section, we will return to “logos”, including not only redressing the 
misunderstandings mentioned above, but a systematic cognition toward guiding human survival, 
production and living using reason, rationality, and reasonableness. It is required to track back to 
logos in a more comprehensive perspective, and this may be just principle, on which all of 
criterion to judge whether reasonable or not are based, that we're looking for adapted by the 
current age. 
The last part is intended to be the conclusion of this paper. After all these arguments, we 
hope that readers will be convinced sincerely that if reason is the principle of our ultimate 
concern and if rationality is the instrumental, purposeful principle in natural science, then 
reasonableness can serve to be the principle of human practical life which embraces morality, 
laws, arts etc. Furthermore, another significant thesis elucidated in this paper is that any attempt 
to break them apart or any ambition of being relied on only one form of logos family to build a 
world alone may cause the crisis of mankind. In this way, this paper aims to track bake to logos 
in comprehensive perspective, which comes from the three expressions of logos family 
integrally. 
 
2. Logos and its evolution 
 
In order to figure out where logos family come from, we are willing to start with some splendid 
research achievements introduced by intellectual predecessors who have already carried on the 
discussions about logos, and look back on how these sages have witnessed the evolutionary 
development and inter-dimensional transformation of logos step by step. 
 
2.1. The origin of logos 
 
The ancient Greek term logos, the original root of the modern English word “reason”, is 
generally regarded as the basic principle of everything in the universe. The writing 
of Heraclitusis is the first place where the word logos appears in ancient Greek 
philosophy (Peters, 1967, pp. 28-35). For Heraclitus, logos is mainly used to indicate the 
regularity of birth and death. Heraclitus considers that fire is the origin of the whole of the world, 
which is burning in a certain scale and under the will of logos (Guthrie, 1967, p. 45). His starting 
point is that the order of the universe is regulated neither by god nor by people, but by its own 
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logos. Heraclitus believes that each coin has its two sides, and interdependence and mutual 
struggle between opposite sides are exactly the cause of evolution and progress, which is called 
logos. He also thinks that the competition between contrary sides gives birth to a balance or a 
harmonious order. Behind everything there is a fundamental principle, a central word, a 
dominant force or a potential god. Logos, which represents all forms of ultimate, genuineness, 
and primacy, commands all people and objects prostrating themselves in worship and following 
the operation law of logos. Logos is eternal, similar to "the law of god," and it is a fallacy to 
deviate from it. This term, logos, often signifies that the ultimate truth, or identifies with the 
God. (Peters, 1967, pp. 28-35) 
Logos is seen as a natural law, the original substance and motivation for mastering and 
ruling all things. Logos, in other words, as a kind of omnipotent power throughout the universe 
according to requirements of rational principles ruled by natural law, is the basis of law and 
justice, the root of good and evil. Besides, logos is often considered as a part of the soul, 
including the purpose of the universe and human life, with a value and a sense of direction. 
Furthermore, logos distinguishes humans from the other species, at the same time, reflects the 
limitation of people in the face of the God, universe and fate. 
The connotation of logos is not set in stone. Literally speaking, logos is a word which 
could mean for example “speech” or “explanation” or an “account” (Audi, 1999, p. 346). 
However, the earliest major philosophers to publish in English, such as Francis Bacon, Thomas 
Hobbes, and John Locke, also routinely wrote in Latin and French, and compared their 
expressions to Greek, treating the words logos, ratio and reason as inter-changeable. The 
meaning of the word "reason" in senses such as "human reason" also overlaps to a large extent 
with "rationality", and the adjective of "reason" in philosophical contexts is normally "rational", 
rather than "reasoned" or "reasonable". Some philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, for example, 
also used the word ratiocination as a synonym for "reasoning" (Hobbes, 1666, p. 289). Yet an 
independent existence of universal logos was clearly suggested by Heraclitus. As the natural law 
guiding the operation of everything, logos developed into three different dimensional variants, 
namely reason, rationality, and reasonableness, accompanied by the process of the development 
of human history. That is to say, the evolution of logos seems to be corresponding to the 
development of human society. There is an intrinsic relationship under the evolution of three 
variants of logos. In different historical periods, each variant of logos has its own glory days 
respectively. In the rest of this section, we will introduce how three different expressions of 
logos occupy the dominant position respectively in different times. And this also provides us 
with reason and basis theories that help us reflect on the expression and position of logos after all 
of these disputes. 
 
2.2. The domination of reason and rationality 
 
From the age of Aristotle, the speculative pursuit of knowledge has played a central role in 
human culture. This can be called the glory age of “reason”. At that time, “philosophy” refers to 
the whole range of systematic and methodical treatment of any inquiries, embracing all kinds of 
subjects from geometry and astronomy at one pole, to aesthetics and historical narrative at the 
other, regardless of whether the twentieth century would classify them as Science and 
Technology or not. In all these studies, “reason” plays a core part. And for more than two 
thousand years, all such studies are equally considered (Toulmin, 2001, p. 15). No field of 
investigation or speculation is dismissed as intrinsically un-philosophical. Human adaptability 
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and mathematical rigor are regarded equally as twin aspects of the human reason (Toulmin, 
2001, p. 14). 
However, from the mid-seventeenth century on, an imbalance begins to develop. The 
switch from philosophical egalitarianism to scientific hierarchy at the beginning does not entirely 
exclude those essayists who set out to illuminate key features of our lives rather than trying to 
prove theoretical truths, and who invite us to share reflections rather than checking deductions. 
This change takes place gradually over three or four centuries (Toulmin, 2001, p. 22) But in the 
twentieth century, notably in the USA, academic philosophy becomes a narrowly technical 
subject concerned with abstract theories, and the concrete concerns of autobiographical authors 
like Montaigne are generally ignored as being intrinsically un-philosophical (Toulmin, 2001, p. 
23). 
In the twentieth century, scholars in the universities of Europe, North America, and their 
zone of influence have been preoccupied with the concept of rationality (Toulmin, 2001, p. 1). 
There is a widespread tendency to insist on the superiority of theoretical abstraction and logical 
deduction, at the expense of directly human modes of analysis. Along with this rivalry, there 
emerges the contrast between “Two Cultures” of the Natural Sciences and the Humanities. 
(Snow, p. 2) It is true in the whole spectrum of academic fields, from the physical sciences at one 
pole to the humanities at the other (Toulmin, 2001, p.1). Certain methods of inquiry and subjects 
are seen as philosophically serious or “rational” in a way that others are not. As a result, a 
competition for attention comes out across all realms of inquiry. Subjects like comparative 
literature, linguistics, and aesthetics have refocused on methodological questions about the 
legitimacy of ideas and ways of thought whose validity they has previously taken for granted. 
Eventually, there is a hierarchy of prestige so that investigations and activities are ordered with 
an eye to certain intellectual demands. 
In 1920s to 1930s, scholars and critics, as much as natural scientists, share a common 
confidence in their established procedures (Toulmin, 2001, p. 1). The term “scientific method” 
embraces, for them, all the methods of observation, deduction, generalization, and the rest that 
have been found appropriate for the problems and issues preoccupying those subjects. Focusing 
on rationality, academic writers have neglected to analyze the complementary concept of 
reasonableness. Yet as we find in all our present inquiries, the bureaucratization of learning has 
created as many problems as it solves.  
 
2.3. Revival of reasonableness 
 
Since the 1960s, the years have seen a revived interest in questions about practical values in 
medical ethics, ecology, and other practical fields. This turning of the tide points to a future in 
which the rational demands of scientific technique will be balanced by attention to the demand of 
the human situations in which intellectual or practical skills can reasonably be put to use. 
(Toulmin, 2001, p. 2) 
For now, however, the spotlight remains on the intellectual validity of rationality itself: 
the human values of reasonableness are expected to justify themselves in the court of rationality. 
The answers of questions have not yet been generally accepted in the world academy—whether 
the twin concepts of “rationality” and “reasonableness” are interdependent ideas or not? How do 
these two concepts differ from, and relate to, each other? And how do we reach a point at which 
they came to be at cross-purposes with each other? On its face, this is a historical problem, to be 
answered in historical terms. 
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Thus, we need to restore the original meaning of logos, not in order to put it again in the 
museum, or on the altar, but to fully understand its evolutionary process. 
 
3. Logos as reason, rationality, or reasonableness 
 
Reason, rationality, and reasonableness can be translated identically into “lǐ xìng, 理性” in 
Chinese. Similarly, these three words have been used as “logos” in the English-speaking world 
in certain ages. In this part, we will discuss what happens when reason, rationality, and 
reasonableness are regarded as logos, respectively, and what defects they have. 
 
3.1. Reason as logos 
 
3.1.1. The universal reason as objectivism 
 
Reason, as the alternative form of logos, is dispersed with Galileo’s victory which consolidated 
the reign of a unique reason, a fully objective reason. Similar to the Galilean process, the 
Cartesian project of objectifying the subject pushes the separation of res cogitans and res 
extensa. He regards res cogitans as a fully independent object, attributed by an autonomous 
thinking quality, and wants to demonstrate its mathematical objectivity, same as the res extensa. 
As such, Descartes opens the gate to the domination of objectivism whose name is universal 
reason (van Doan, 2001, p. 21). For him, all sciences are ultimately one science which is 
understood as universal. Unlike Aristotle who happens to believe that the different subject 
matters of different sciences demand different methods, Descartes argues that differences 
between the sciences are only a result of our cognitive activity, similar to the way the distinctions 
between the arts depend on the exercise and disposition of body. That is to say, the limitation of 
cognitive abilities brings about the sharply divided disciplines. Like Galileo, Descartes is 
convinced of the idea of one universal science and of one universal method (van Doan, 2001, p. 
21). His success in showing that geometrical propositions can be proved by arithmetical mean 
pleads against Aristotle, who asserts that geometry, and arithmetic, constitutes distinct sciences, 
and who has denied that geometrical propositions can be proved arithmetically, proceeds to 
declare that there is only one universal science, and universal method in like manner (Descartes, 
2008, p. 149). 
However, Descartes is inclined toward natural science as the model of research, and as 
the unified science, revealing his ambition to construct the unique science with a mathematical 
method. To look for the foundation upon which one can build any scientific knowledge, he turns 
to the Archimedean point, which indicates the basis of knowledge definitely being indubitable, 
which means self-evident (Descartes, 2008, p. 144). In the first place, Descartes needs to find this 
absolutely universal and objective thing. To Descartes’ point of view, res cotigans is a substance 
which is as much independently self-subsistent as an external thing, res extensa. As he notes, 
thinking substance is a complete thing no less than that which is extended. And the corporeal 
substance of res cotigans is occasional. Descartes wants to establish the objective criteria which 
are taken for granted in mathematics. These criteria are of qualitative and quantitative measure 
(Descartes, 1967, p. 411). Although, it is not difficult to find that, in his later research, Descartes 
is confused in separating res cogitans, from the arithmetical perspective, from res extensa, which 
is also in the arithmetical conception from his belief. Since our purpose here is to show that 
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Descartes’ separation of res cogitans from res extensa is the source of modern dualism, we will 
not delve deeper in his difficulty.  
Nonetheless, having defended the autonomous status of res cogitansand its mathematical 
objectivity, Descartes cannot say res cogitansis exactly the foundation of science, because he 
needs to prove that res cogitansis constructed on the indubitable foundation which is called Ego 
cogito (Descartes, 1908, p. 10). He argues that the indubitability of the cogito is irrefutable 
because the cogito is neither a question of logical nor analytical inference. It is evident because 
we intuit it. In this way, the Ego is no longer a subjective individual, but the most objective, or 
the most universal and necessary Ego which serves as the transcendental condition of science. 
And according to the Cartesian process of transformation of the cogito to the principle or axiom, 
Descartes tacitly takes cogito as reason itself (Descartes, 2001, p. 4). 
More specifically, Descartes seems to put it this way: only the thinking subject is the real 
and objective ground which can warrant truth, and as such, can lay foundation to science. But the 
thinking subject is primarily a thing, a fully objectified thing. As such, though Descartes still 
keeps the term subject, it is evident that the real subjective subject has gone for the sake of 
objectivity (van Doan, 2001 p. 30). In short, what Descartes contributes to modern science is his 
intention to get rid of subjectivity. And considering his great efforts directed toward subject-
object dualism, and his insistence on understanding objectivity in the sense of an arithmetical 
axiom, he can be considered as the father of “universal reason”, a kind of logos which is 
constructed on arithmetical calculus and which serves as the best instrument to knowledge. In 
this way, logos also loses its original meaning. 
 
3.1.2. The misunderstanding of universal reason 
 
In the previous part, we briefly described the objectification of the thinking subject by tackling 
Descartes’ fatal division of res cogitans and res extensa. In this part, we wish to point out: it is a 
critical error to misjudge the ontological aspect of reason, which is the main cause of the de-
transformation of reason into rationality. We will follow Heidegger’s critique of rationalistic 
reason and his effort to reconstruct reason in its ontological dimension.  
According to Heidegger, our misunderstanding of reason primarily brings about our 
misunderstanding of both science and technology. Since Galileo and, after him, the British 
empiricists, the positivists hold the view that natural science is the sovereign domain of truth. 
Unaware of the limitation of scientific thinking, and the capricious nature of technology, we 
hence tend to identify reason with rationality, technology with machine technology. Heidegger 
(1980) holds the view that the reason of such a misunderstanding of technology lies deeply in the 
process of artificial transformation of reason into rationality. It forcefully transforms science into 
a kind of know-how, and reason into a kind of manual instructions (Heidegger, 1980, p. 28). In 
another words, technology is stripped of its ontological character and becomes a mere 
instrument, a so-called instrumental reason. 
Considering the reconstruction of reason, as far as Heidegger is concerned, rationality can 
be possible if it is born in and lives in reason, because rationality is only the appearance of 
reason, or the reincarnated reason in time and space. For Heidegger, both rationality and reason 
belong to Being, though they are different fundamentally and on performance. Rationality is 
determined by the temporal and spatial characteristics of Being while reason itself belongs to the 
essential realm of Being (Held, p.164). On one hand, in Heidegger’s opinion, the history of 
Reason is identical with that of Being. In other words, Reason can be fully understood only if it 
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is born in Being, and comes from Being itself (Heidegger, 2002a, pp. 36-38). On the other hand, 
Heidegger has seen the inseparability between Logos and Being (Heidegger, 2002b, p. 36). It 
seems to him that Logos bears the same character of as Being. (Heidegger, 1975, p. 60). To sum 
up, Reason, Logos and Being share the common root which has characteristics of transcendence 
and self-manifestation. However, in the eyes of rationalists, Being is no more than the res 
extensa, the external subjected to the res cogitans. Thus, it assumes that Being can be precisely 
calculated. In short, Being is just an instrument like any other tool. In contrast to such an 
understanding of Being, Heidegger seeks to restore the authentic nature of Being. Being is a 
dynamic, living reality which cannot be limited by time or space. It transcends all limits which 
restrict it. In a word, it is itself a transcendent act. In terms of Heidegger, transcendence is 
described as below: 
 
Transcendence is firstly the relationship between being and Being starting from 
the former and going toward the latter. Transcendence is, however, at the same 
time the relationship leading from the changeable being to a being in respose. 
Transcendence, finally, corresponding to the use of the title “Excellency”, is that 
highest being itself which can then also be called “Being” from which results a 
strange mixture with the first mentioned meaning. (Heidegger, 2002a, p. 57) 
 
Therefore, transcendence determines or reveals the authenticity of Being. That means, 
transcendence is the Reason which reveals Being. In this way, Heidegger points out the defective 
consequences of the over-admiration of the objectivism of universal reason and relying on 
universal reason alone to guide science and technology, that is, the misjudging of reason with 
rationality (van Doan, 2001, p. 145). In the meanwhile, according to the establishment of the 
common root among Reason, Logos and Being, Heidegger finishes the work of reconstruction of 
reason, reversing the tendency of neglecting the original meaning of logos since Cartesian times. 
 
3.2. Rationality as logos 
 
3.2.1. The crisis of rationality 
 
The crisis of rationality stems from the ambition of the rationalists and empiricists to build a 
social world solely on rationality (von Doan, 2001, pp. 3-4). It is related to the crisis of science, 
and admitted by scientists themselves such as Oppenheimer, Weizsacker and many 
scientifically-minded persons such as Husserl, Horkheimer, etc. (van Doan, 2001, p. 16). We are 
warned about the current human sciences, however successful their achievement was in the past, 
and however notable their contribution to the collection of precise data and the codification 
might be, standing in danger of losing life-meaning. 
Beside what has been mentioned above, the scientific method which used to be the 
correct mean of knowledge is either ridiculed or put in doubt (van Doan, 2001, p. 17). For those 
who laugh at the scientific method, reason seems to head mistakenly toward tragic self-
destruction. Many anti-positivists claim the breakdown of science and describe such a disaster as 
the loss of life-meaningfulness. Like Heidegger, they state the similar idea that the development 
of the process of dehumanization in the form of contemporary positivism leads to a virtual 
breakdown (van Doan, 2001, p. 18) In addition, Husserl traces the cause of such a disaster back 
to the mathematization of nature in Galileo’s science and in Kant’s proclamation of the end of 
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traditional metaphysics (van Doan, 2001, p. 19) Likewise, Horkheimer (1947), who sees the 
death-symptom of rationality visible in the claim of all modern ideologies, and in the 
“arrogance” of science based on “technical knowledge”, denounces that it is “rationality” itself 
that is the cause of human insanity (p. 33).  
 
3.2.2. Husserl’s reaction to rationality 
 
The mistake that taking the model of mathematics for the universal model put forward by 
Descartes is denounced by Husserl with his striking analysis of the process of mathematization 
since Galileo. We will present a brief sketch of his main propositions and figure out how he 
connects the crisis of science with the deformation of rationality. And Husserl’s criticism 
provides a reason for our reflection on the necessity of returning to the original reasonableness. 
According to Husserl (1992), Galileo’s mathematization of nature particularly leads to 
the crisis of science, which consists of three steps: to take pure geometry as the most universal 
spatial model; to consider nature as mathematical in physics; to calculate senses (Husserl, pp. 20-
92). Although the process of mathematization, considered by Husserl, is not accidental, (van 
Doan, 2001, p. 33), the tendency of universalization and necessity implicit in science is pushed 
far beyond its limits. There is nothing wrong with a demand for clarity or certainty, but one 
should reflect on its degree once they are applied to human world. Winch (1958) suggests that 
science should know its own limit by minding its own business and philosophy should do the 
same thing (p.8). More explicitly, the difference between scientists’ and philosophers’ aims 
might be expressed as follows: the scientist investigates the nature, causes and effects of 
particular real things and processes, whereas the philosopher is concerned with the nature of 
reality as such and in general. Therefore, there must be a distinction between multi-dimensional 
forms of logos, depending on which kind of relation, and on which subject it deals with. That 
means, rationality, if it is isolated or separated from the life-world, will be a mere tool, and 
deprived of any meaning of life. 
Looking back to the tendency of mathematization of nature and of human life-world, it is 
pushed much farther after Descartes. As followers of Descartes and advocates of empiricism, 
Locke and Hume maintain the view that what counts as science must be of exact, clear and 
evident in nature (Husserl, 1992, p. 3). In this regard, the most satisfiable thing is the “fact” 
itself. In Husserl’s (1992) own expression, the “mere-fact sciences” transform men into “fact-
men” (p. 4). That is to say, man is not much different from any outside factor whose function is 
merely mechanical. Needless to say, man is stripped of his subjectivity, and consequently the 
meaning of his existence. But such a universal science is unacceptable, because the life-world is 
not an accumulation of experiences or facts, but a living world. It is a life lived by human beings, 
not a concept or a dead thing. The past idea that a science, fully separate and independent, could 
be the foundation of human life, or in our context, could serve to be the reason of human life is 
no longer tenable. In Husserl’s (1992) view, to restore the role of science, to reconstruct the 
function of rationality, one should recognize the importance of life-world, and accept the fact 
that science is in fact nothing but a distillation from the life-world (p. 12). Thus, the principle of 
life must be found in human-life, which is exactly reasonableness.    
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3.3. Reasonableness as logos 
 
3.3.1. Reasonableness as human nature 
 
In this part, we will proceed to discuss reasonableness and its common root of logos. The main 
source is Tao, a traditional theory in ancient China, which came up with their own expression, 
focusing mainly on human nature and conflicts of human interests, to which reasonableness 
seems to be the only solution. 
The literature of Chinese philosophy is fully stuffed with all sorts of discussions centered 
around human nature. What is human nature? We will venture a step further to first understand 
what constitutes human nature. In the meantime, it means there are some characteristics which 
help us to understand human nature. These special characteristics can be human acts, language, 
creative activity, artistic life, etc. Then we proceed to ask why these things are much different 
from those of animals. The answer would be because our acts are always oriented toward a goal 
which in turn satisfies our needs, desires, and interests and that our acts are not random in the 
sense that they are well designed and executed to attain the desired goal. We will know that, 
through these special things which make man different from animals, man is rational. And all of 
these things which constitute human nature as rational are guided by interests which are 
manifested in the diverse pattern of human life. But there is another troublesome phenomenon 
concealed behind the identification above: What predetermines good or bad comes not from a 
priori innate idea of evil or goodness which is implanted in the human brain from birth, but from 
whether or not some acts, or some results conform or satisfy our basic human interests. The same 
act occurs in different cultures, countries, races or even parties, which may use diverse 
evaluation criterion. For instance, telling the truth may be good for one and bad for another; a 
custom may be regarded as sacred in one country while evil in another. There are numerous 
examples showing that human nature is not so much determined as it is historically and socially 
constructed, but known by virtue of human activities of solving problems, of enjoying, of 
hoping, and of contracting nature, other fellows, and himself, etc. In the meanwhile, any human 
activity conducted as special things distinguished from animals always presupposes a certain 
relationship with (1) oneself, (2) others, and (3) nature. From an internal act toward himself, man 
demands a self-consciousness, a desire of self-being. From an inter-subjective act, man strives 
for harmony, peace, and happiness. From an external act toward nature, man always looks for 
something which can satisfy his knowledge, needs and curiosity, etc. (van Doan, p. 197) In a 
word, human nature can at best be seen from what constitutes it, and this what is none other than 
human interests which are visible in human activities and relationships. 
 
3.3.2. Reasonableness as human interests 
 
Ancient Chinese philosophers never refuse to talk about the question, “What is man?”. However, 
the point they follow in grasping this question is not an analysis of the meaning of human beings, 
but a phenomenological description of how man is becoming man (van Doan, 2001, p. 197). 
That is to say, man is not a priori determined but developing. To be in the world means that man 
has to learn to deal with others, or more precisely, with others’ interests. In this context, the way 
of regulating, distributing interests, and solving the problems of interests-conflict is called 
reasonableness in the case of Confucius. To prove that reasonableness has much to do with 
interests, we need to make a qualification concerning our explanation of the nature of interests. 
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According to Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, human needs could be divided into five 
hierarchical categories, namely physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization 
(Maslow, 1943, pp. 370–396). Compared with Maslow's theory, we need to turn to the 
Confucian way of classifying human interests mentioned in works as follows: (1) physiological 
interests (2) knowledge interests, (3) esteem interests, and (4) self-actualization interest.  
The first kind of human interests which is regarded by Confucius as humanly most 
natural is physiological interest. By physiological interests, he means interests in wealth and 
daily needs, such as food, clothes, horse, carriage, money and so on, which can be considered the 
fundamental interest of the physical body and not the spirit. As Confucius (1998) said: 
 
Wealth and rank are what every man desires. (p. 41) 
 
The second kind of human interests, on which Confucius puts much more emphasis 
compared with physiological interest, is the interests in learning, or interests in knowledge. Why 
should we learn, and what can we learn? As Confucius (1998) believes, we learn not only for the 
sake of learning, but also for an accumulation of knowledge which can (1) solve human 
problems:  
 
Just as the hundred apprentices must live in workshops to perfect themselves in 
their craft, so the gentleman studies, that he may improve himself in the Way. (p. 
253) 
 
(2) transform a man into a better one： 
 
Highest are those who are born wise. Next are those who become wise by 
learning. After then come those who have toil painfully in order to acquire 
learning. Finally, to the lowest class of the common people belong those who 
toil painfully without ever managing to learn. (Confucius, 1998, p. 221) 
 
And (3) point out the right way: 
 
A gentleman who is wide versed in letters and at the same time knows how to 
submit his learning to the restraints of ritual is not likely, I think, to go far 
wrong. (Confucius, 1998, p. 75) 
 
In the third place, we will proceed to refer briefly to human interests in ethical problems, 
including moral laws, which is the quintessence of Confucian thought. As a matter of fact, all 
thought of Confucius is based on so-called esteem interests and the Confucian reasonableness is 
mainly constructed on these esteem interests. According to an article called Balanced Enquires: 
Criticisms on Confucius concerning about humanity and written by Wang Chong (1907, ch. 
xxxiii), a follower of Confucius, he who can practice five things wherever he may be is a man of 
humanity, those are earnestness (rén, 仁), generosity (yì, 义), liberality (lǐ, 礼), intelligence (zhì, 
智) and truth-fullness (xìn, 信). And these can be gained through the human act of mutual 
recognition, social engagement, and cultural and historical life.  
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The last type of human interests is about how human beings conform to this world. For 
Confucius, we are living in a harmonious world and should not disturb a natural course relative 
to history, as Zeng Tsu (2011) said: 
 
What The Great Learning teaches, is—to illustrate illustrations virtue; to 
renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence. (p. 3) 
 
The alienation of the world would not come about until humans tend to build an abnormal 
relation to it. Evidently, the whole of humanity share the common wish and desire within the 
fourth kind of interest. However, not all of the interests would provide every human with a 
common desire, hope for a better life and ultimate concerns. There are always conflicts born 
from interests. Sometimes, they come from the purpose of interests or the methods of reaching 
interests; sometimes they come from the unequal distribution of interests. What’s more, conflicts 
may spring from the different value and meaning of interests. 
By describing reasonableness as the different principles which help us to cope with 
external events, to conform or to adjust ourselves to the environment and society, to develop 
ourselves into a much more ideal stage, to self-correct when needed, to enjoy aesthetically our 
lives, we wish to say, that reasonableness can serve to mediate human relationships and interests 
among individuals, or between man and himself. It is also clear that rationality differs from 
reasonableness, and Confucius has understood reason only in terms of reasonableness, which is 
to commit the naive mistake of reductionism. Since the thesis is not about what would be going 
on if Confucius had used rationality in dealing with external nature, but that reasonableness 
concerns itself mainly with the human life-world and its Weltanschauung, it cannot be excluded 
from other forms in the logos family, i.e., rationality and reason as logos. 
 
4. Return to Logos 
 
At the beginning, we put forward three research objectives, namely 1) figuring out multi-
dimensional forms of logos, namely reason, rationality, and reasonableness respectively, and 
how these three variants evolve from logos step by step; 2) what defects there are when reason, 
rationality, and reasonableness are regarded as logos alone; 3) how to approach a more authentic 
logos in a comprehensive perspective based on predecessor’s experience and lessons. The first 
two problems have been solved above. The last one will be discussed emphatically in this 
section. In order to sketch out a version of comprehensive logos, we will discuss the following 
three aspects: 1) what does logos consist of?; 2) what does the internal relationship look like 
among elements of logos?; 3) what benefits will it bring when we return to an authentic logos? 
The self-manifestation of logos in its manifold forms such as reason, rationality, and 
reasonableness is the main content of logos, which can be understood in terms of the human 
relationship with nature (rationality), with others (reasonableness), and with the inner world 
(reason). In other words, reason expresses the ontological and metaphysical (theological) 
dimension of man; rationality, taken to be the most effective instrument in dealing with 
technological knowledge and advance, reflects the human technical interest of dominating nature 
and of deciding human fate; reasonableness is constructed on human tentative solution of 
conflicts, on human relationship, and understanding which happen in daily life. 
After understanding the content of the new logos divided into three dimensions and their 
differences, the second step is to sort out the internal relationship among dimensions of new 
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logos. Answering the question of the metaphysical dimension on the guidance of reason tends to 
take humans for a community, for the sake of world peace, social harmony and cultural 
integration; to answer the question of the dimension of natural science under the guidance of 
instrumental rationality, human being are seen as a part of nature; to answer the problem of 
human social life in the sense of reasonableness, it is inclined to solve the problem of practical 
conflicts created by human as individuals. That is to say, the dimensional relationships among 
three kinds of elements of the new logos are both cross and parallel. On one hand, regardless of 
which dimensional perspective, human goals are regarded as the ultimate interests from 
beginning to end. On the other hand, when human survival, production and living problems are 
handled with different rational principles, properties of the human and the role it plays in history 
are distinct in accordance with different perspectives. 
The third step needs to be divided into two directions: one to focus on objectives of each 
dimensional term of logos concerns, the other to discuss the significance of approaching logos. 
Summarized from previous theories which have been described, as a matter of fact, the objects 
about which three manifolds of expressions are the same, yet because of the differences of 
dimensions discussed, we are led to distinct theoretical results. When talking about god guided 
by ultimate reason, freedom and equality does not need to rely on a particularly specific case in 
life. God is abstract, representational and windy; but in the discussion of god in terms of 
reasonableness, god is no longer abstract. Because people need a savior or leader to guide them 
out of poverty and wars, a monarch comes into being under the guidance of reasonableness, 
playing logos' role in real life. Similarly, dealing with natural science, people can treat rationality 
as the behavior criterion, interpreting the world into strings of formula and theorem, and all of 
the feelings of love are physiological needs; and when people use reasonableness as the 
principle, one is more willing to regard individual interests as the ultimate value, and take 
individual desires for the code of conduct. Once one’s desire is fulfilled, he wins what he wants. 
In other words, reason, rationality, and reasonableness are three layers wrapping around the life-
world. The content of these tiers are the same, yet just at different levels. If we say that reason 
cares more about the pure, logical, idealized aspect, then rationality tends to concentrate on the 
theoretical instrumental purposed aspect, while reasonableness focuses on practical workings in 
accordance with daily and ordinary life. Thus, we conclude that reason only cares about the 
ultimate concern, which raises everything to the metaphysical dimension, and only discusses the 
existence of the ultimate propositions, such as freedom and equality. Rationality only cares about 
science and theoretical tools. In the eyes of rationality advocators it seems that everything 
follows operating rules precisely and tens of thousands of phenomena require quantitative 
measurement. When people take reasonableness as a principle, they are concerned about goals, 
interests, tangible and practical action, as well as morality, which looks noble while actually 
serving the community in order to maximize profit. 
The latter direction that needed to be answered is how it makes sense to find out about the 
new logos. In fact, there are four main points:  
 
1) This is a question of values. Based on the different perspectives of value, man 
can gain different answers in the same issues. 
2) It helps us to choose and switch neatly between different types of logos 
expressions, making us live better in this changing world.  
3) We need to repeat once more our main thesis that any attempt to separate the 
entirety of reason, rationality, and reasonableness and any effort to use only one 
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principle, be it reason, or rationality, or reasonableness would cause a crisis of 
knowledge and of human life, as well as of science; in addition, a stagnation, or 
backwardness in terms of the process of human civilization. 
4) Logos is no longer just the origin of reason, no longer just the ancient Greek 
root. In this modern world, it should play a new role, corresponding to the 
diversity of human activities and the multitudinous social production way of life. 
Therefore, the restoration of logos involves a full range of guiding significance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Until now, in order to unravel the relationships between reason, rationality, and reasonableness, 
we have described a brief evolutionary history of logos, discussed the origin of reason, outlined 
the mis-transformation of reason into rationality, analyzed the crisis of rationality as well as 
hinted that reasonableness may be a form of reason which deals with social conflicts. Besides, 
accompanied by the transmutation of historical background, the law of logos evolution seems to 
depend on the law of the development of human civilization. In this context, readers will be 
convinced sincerely that if reason is the principle of our ultimate concern, and if rationality is the 
instrumental, purposeful principle in natural science, then reasonableness can serve to be the 
principle of human practical life which embraces morality, laws, arts etc. Furthermore, the other 
significant thesis elucidated in this paper is that any attempt to break them apart, or any ambition 
of relying on only one form of reason to build a world alone, may cause the crisis of mankind. In 
the fourth section, after looking back on the whole of evolutionary history, it seems that logos 
could be further pictured comprehensively from three aspects: the content, internal relationship, 
and benefits of logos, which is adapted by wisdom and draws lessons from predecessors, guiding 
people how to make decisions in the process of social life, and getting rid of chaos in human 
living. 
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